The benefit game of highway overload

Introduction: new page 1 in view of the increasing overloading of large trucks and serious damage to roads in recent years, which once caused a serious traffic jam for 13 days in Badaling section of Beijing Zhangjiakou expressway, and repeatedly caused major safety accidents, Beijing and four surrounding provinces and cities decided to jointly manage the overload phenomenon from December 1, 2003 Since the establishment of the autonomous government, any truck that is overloaded will be unloaded before entering Beijing, and a fine will be issued for warning Why is overload so serious? CCTV reporter once made an investigation on the drivers Because of the fierce competition in the large truck transportation industry, the competitive price of freight, as well as various fines on the way, there is no money to make if the large truck is not overloaded This can be said to be the most fundamental reason for overload According to CCTV reporters, from Datong, Shanxi Province to Qinhuangdao port, a truck of coal will not be overloaded, and it will cost more than 3000 yuan to go completely according to the regulations From this point of view, overloading is a helpless act Once there is a traffic accident, shippers, highway departments, transporters and innocent people all have to pay a heavy price of property or even life Therefore, overloading is a high social cost behavior, which must be managed What is behind this governance is the readjustment and redistribution of the interests of all parties concerned These involved truckers, shippers, fines agencies along the way, consumers and the road sector Before dealing with overload, truck carriers should ensure their own interests by overload measures, for the benefit of owners, truck carriers, consumers and fine organizations along the way The owner of goods is the beneficiary because they can enjoy lower transportation cost; the freight forwarder is the beneficiary because they pay the tolls according to the distance and nominal tonnage of the road, and do not increase the tolls due to overloading; the consumer is the beneficiary because the freight is low, the cost of cost sharing is less, so the price of consumer goods is low; the fine institution along the way is the beneficiary , because they can charge for various items from passing vehicles All the benefits of these beneficiary groups are based on the premise of damaging the interests of the road sector, that is to say, they pass on the cost to the road sector and society The injured is the highway department, because the overloaded will not pay more tolls, but in order to repair the damaged roads, the highway department has to pay a lot of extra costs every year After the overload control, the status of the beneficiary and the injured has changed: the beneficiary is the highway department: the overload control will effectively alleviate the damage of the road, the toll will not be less, and the highway department will no longer have to pay for the frequent damaged road repair The victims were shippers, truckers and consumers For the owner of goods, restrictions on overloading make the transporter no longer be able to spread low cost through multi shipment of goods, which will inevitably cause the freight to rise, and the owner will increase the cost expenditure; after the cost increases, the owner will generally put the multi expenditure freight into the commodity price, if the transportation is vegetables, daily necessities, etc., the price will rise, and the consumer will pay for the increased freight, if it is the supplier to the port for export The exporter will pay for the goods; if the owner refuses to increase the freight, the transporter has only one way to go out of business, because the freight forwarder has only one way to make money by overloading Only the interests of the fine institutions along the way, whether before or after governance, are not affected at all We might as well analyze the consequences that have occurred and will continue to occur after controlling the overload and overrun phenomenon: this policy not only reduces the overload phenomenon of large trucks, but also reduces the overload of large trucks In less than a week, the price of vegetables in Beijing has risen nearly 30%, the number of vehicles entering or passing through Beijing has decreased significantly, the price of vegetables in Tianjin has also increased, and the freight transport of coastal ports has been greatly affected These are social costs If it continues, not to mention that the rising vegetable prices have an impact on urban people's lives, make it difficult to sell in the production areas, increase social unemployment, and at the same time harm the export and port business, because a large number of goods are transported to the port by large trucks Taking into account the multiplier effect, this adverse effect will also be amplified This is the reality Therefore, in my opinion, this governance activity is a game process of all stakeholders On the surface, it is a game between the transporter and the highway department In fact, it involves all aspects, because someone has to pay for straightening out this economic relationship From an economic point of view, people's income from engaging in economic activities must be greater than (at least equal to) the cost, so that this activity can continue This is true whether it is truck transportation or overload management The purpose of management is not to cancel the truck transportation, but to standardize the transportation behavior If the economic problems of producing area and selling area are caused by overload, it is equal to that the society has paid another cost So I think that although this governance is very necessary, it is impossible for the highway department to bear the extra cost that should not be borne by it for a long time, but the governance is simply aimed at overloaded trucks, and the means adopted are only unloading and fines, and it is not appropriate to deal with the causes of overloaded trucks As mentioned before, overload and overrun are caused by low freight and excessive fines The low freight is determined by market competition The government has no legal person to intervene, and with the increasing and continuous efforts to control overload and overrun, the freight will inevitably rise However, fines can be intervened by the government If we can rectify the disorderly fines, we can first-hand control the overload and overrun It is much better to control the load limit and to control the fines in one hand in two ways than to simply unload the fines Unloading fine is a way of blocking but not sparing It's a typical "headache, headache, pain, and pain" At best, it's just a simple transposition of the beneficiary and the injured Although it can work in a short time, it's not low in social cost and it's hard to last Therefore, we must straighten out the economic relations among the various interest subjects, so as to fundamentally solve the problem Zhi